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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  notion  of  public  relations  contributing  to the  fabric  of  society  is heavily  contested  in
the  public  sphere  and  under-researched  by  the academy.  The  authors  of  this  paper  pro-
pose that the  study  of the  relevance  of public  relations  to  society  can  be  enlightened  by
turning  to economics.  Using  information  asymmetry  as  a framework,  the argument  is  that
public  relations  can  be analyzed  as  a social institution  that  both  helps  to  mitigate  mar-
ket  imperfections  and  consequently  increases  the  efﬁciency  with  which  society’s  resources
are allocated  as  well  as  the  chances  for more  market  participants  to  derive  value  out  of
economic transactions.
© 2015 Elsevier  Inc. All  rights  reserved.
1. Public relations and society
The notion of public relations contributing to the fabric of society is heavily contested in the public sphere and under-
researched by the academy. As long as this remains the case, public relations will not complete its journey to professionalism.
After all, the contemporary lists of requirements for achieving professional status of public relations all include some form of
constitutive or sustaining role for society (Cameron, Sallot, & Weaver-Lariscy, 1996; Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2006; Niemann-
Struweg & Meintjies, 2008; Parsons, 2004).
Instead, public debate about public relations often focuses on the possible harm inﬂicted upon society, with, e.g. the
Economist claiming that “PR man  has conquered the world” (18 December, 2010: 128) and is, according to the International
Herald Tribune (31 January, 2012: 16) ladling out “slop meant to obscure rather than reveal.”
The public relations academy has not provided a counter narrative of equal weight. This is, ﬁrst, because the organization
– not society – is its prevalent level of analysis, as inspired by the excellence study (Grunig, 2006; Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier,
2002), which remains the dominant paradigm for the ﬁeld (Botan & Hazleton, 2009; L’Etang & Pieczka, 2006). Consequently,
the public relations academy mostly theorizes from the viewpoint of managerial rationality and simply implies - mostly
without investigation – that public relations at least does no societal harm, because it enables dialog as an enactment of
mutual balancing between organizations and their publics (Demetrious, 2006).
Second, postmodern and particularly critical scholars repudiate the notion of public relations contributing to society. They
contend that dialogic public relations perpetuates the hegemony of corporations over their environment and of “western”
forms of corporate capitalism over marginalized communities and societies in general (Dutta, 2012; Leitch and Neilson, 1996,
2001; L’Etang & Pieczka, 2006; Munshi & Kurian, 2005). Society will be harmed, they contend, by public relations because it
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serves to maintain managerial hegemony “through the making of concessions at key areas of contestation” (Roper, 2005p.
70; Demetrious, 2013).
Third, the academy has failed to connect public relations with society because the few scholars who use a macroscopic
perspective have remained over-shadowed by the organizational paradigm. Investigations of public relations as a macro-
social phenomenon are typically made by the academy in Europe, but with little impact beyond the continent. The seminal
work by Ihlen et al. (2009) and the special issue of Public Relations Review (33/2007) started the application of grand social
theory to public relations. The more speciﬁc question of how public relations and society interlink has been tackled by
scholars (Ronneberger & Ruehl, 1992; Burkart & Probst, 1991) using, for example, Luhmann’s (1989, 1990, 1995) social
systems theory as well as Habermas’ (1981) communicative action theory. Heath (2006), Heath, Waymer, & Palenchar
2013) has developed the notion of public relations assisting in the workings of a “fully functioning society” and democracy,
building on the arguments of other rhetorical scholars such as Pearson (1989) and Toth and Heath (1992). However, all of
these approaches have had limited impact on the debate about what public relations contributes or is to society.
A gap remains in public relations scholarship that brings organization and society together (Gregory, 2012). Organizations
are actors beyond their managerial utility and they contribute to, shape and help deﬁne society. Indeed the language of
business in particular, increasingly permeates public discourse. Hence, discussing the organizational level of analysis without
including the societal perspective is partial.
2. An economic turn
The authors of this paper propose that the study of the relevance of public relations to society can be enlightened by
turning to economics, which does not have the same bifurcation between organization and society and is “widely seen
as the most advanced of the social sciences with its mathematical formalization, public prestige and Nobel prize awards”
(Ioannides & Nielson, 2007: 1). This requires accepting the economic axiom that society as a whole can and should beneﬁt
from economy as long as markets – provided they function – allow a society to distribute its scarce resources.
Wildman (2008), Podnar, Lah, and Golob (2009) and a special issue of Public Relations Review (35/2009) have reminded
the communication academy more generally of the potential of economic theory and of traditional schools of economic
thought. McKie and Lawniczak (2009: 337) lament the lack of attention to economics and call for macro-economic input
into public relations theory (Lawniczak, 2009). However, turning to economic theory for insights by public relations scholars
has been limited (e.g. Willis, 2012). The authors suspect that this has to do with the educational background of practitioners
and academics and their lack of familiarity with economic theory, and also with the “autistic condition” (Ioannides & Nielson,
2007: 1) of (neo) classical economics that traditionally uses idealized mathematical models and is not open to contingent
social factors.
It is now appropriate to apply economic theory more speciﬁcally to public relations because economic theory has changed.
The recent economic crises have fundamentally called into question the value of (neo) classic economic thought. In response,
economic theories that veer away from the classic homo economicus are gaining traction since they offer richer explanations
of “how the economy really works” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009: 5) by incorporating the human condition. Two of these richer
models have been awarded Nobel Prizes and are at the core of current economic debate: information asymmetry, as advanced
by Akerlof (2000), Spence (1973, 1974, 1980) and Stiglitz (1975, 2001a,b), and “common-pool resources,” as described by
Ostrom (1990, 2009). This paper focuses on the ﬁrst of these two.
3. The market context of public relations
The authors’ argument is that public relations can be analyzed as a social institution that helps to mitigate market
imperfections and consequently both increases the efﬁciency with which society’s resources are allocated and increases the
chances for more market participants to derive value out of economic transactions.
Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz’ starting point is the refutation of the assumption that markets are moved toward perfect efﬁ-
ciency by the “invisible hand”. They challenge the (neo) classical economic axiom that market participants decide rationally,
ultimately allowing every market to reach an equilibrium, of which a good’s price is the most important reﬂection (also called
the “optimal efﬁciency” by Adam Smith). In work spanning over four decades, the three Nobel laureates – Akerlof, Spence
and Stiglitz – describe how markets in reality diverge fundamentally from that assumption, thereby inhibiting the ability
and propensity of rational decision-making and ultimately damaging the capacity of markets to allocate society’s scarce
resources efﬁciently. Crucially for the argument about relevance to society, these imperfections also limit the equitable
distribution of economic participation and welfare (Stiglitz & Walsh, 2006: 239–246).
More speciﬁcally for public relations, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz reject the notion that any market participant has all
the relevant information about the transactions in which he or she chooses to engage, whether that is about the quality of
goods, the nature of the relationship with the other party, the prices of all goods or so-called externalities. Externalities are
the positive or negative consequences that are produced by a speciﬁc transaction, a ﬁeld of transactions or an entire market,
but for which the costs are not borne by the participants of the transaction and are therefore not included in the pricing
system. For example, when a company moves its operations offshore, the social and economic impact on local communities
in the country it is leaving is not borne by the company. While (neo) classical economic theorists mostly exclude these
externalities from their analyses and assume that they will over time be included in the price system (particularly given the
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globalized, highly networked economy), theorists of imperfect markets posit not only that the price system is incapable of
reﬂecting externalities, but also that market participants are constantly at risk of remaining unaware of these external costs,
thus making it more unlikely for a market to produce outcomes to society’s beneﬁt.
According to Spence (2012), markets “are tools that, relative to the alternatives, happen to have great strengths with
respect to incentives, efﬁciency, and innovation. But they are not perfect; they underperform in the presence of externalities
[. . .]  informational gaps and asymmetries, and coordination problems when there are multiple equilibriums, some superior
to others”. This means that buyers and sellers agree on prices that are too low if they don not incorporate negative externalities
(like pollution) or too high if positive externalities (like public health care services for a ﬁrm’s employees) are unknown or
ignored.
When market participants are clueless about costly externalities, the said market will fail to efﬁciently price and allocate
society’s resources or will collapse altogether, as was famously ﬁrst laid out by Akerlof (1970) for the sale of used cars. Buyers
often only know the distribution of product quality, but not the quality of the speciﬁc item in a transaction, while sellers
(like used car salesmen) know both. Akerlof called the damage done to markets by this imbalance “adverse selection”: When
buyers become wary of hidden shortcomings, they will commit fewer resources, for they always risk being sold “lemons” (to
use Akerlof’s term). This decreases the value of all commodities in that market, be they of low or high quality, thus making it
inefﬁcient for sellers of high quality to keep participating. As a result, that market’s efﬁciency is compromised: The incentive
for sellers of high-quality goods to withdraw from the market is high and an equilibrium is reached where only the worst
products are sold. Adverse selection therefore reduces both the volume of a market as well as the average quality of its
products. Consequently, the said market would have a socially less efﬁcient outcome because not all gains from trade could
be realized. Adverse selection has since proven to be a universal idea and a powerful analytical tool in the study of a wide
range of markets, e.g. insurance, credit, mergers, employment, gift exchanges, wages, the caste system, sharecropping, etc.
(Akerlof, 1976, 1984).
The parallels with public relations are apposite. Here we  take a forced example to make the point. Practitioners (sellers)
could be said to trade in the market of trust where they know both the generalities of the levels of trust around an issue
(for example, pollution by the oil industry) and the speciﬁcs of trust around a particular incident (for example, a coastal
oil spill). If the general population (buyers) discover that they have been misled on both the generalities and speciﬁcs they
will, over time, invest less trust (adverse selection) in the oil industry and that sphere of discourse becomes devalued for
all industry participants: the market’s efﬁciency (measured in levels of trust) becomes compromised. Furthermore, those
communicators who sell honestly, for fear of becoming tarnished by the bad practices of those who sell dishonestly, could
well decide to withdraw, leaving the market to the worst practices, devaluing the trust market even more.
In a next step, which could be seen as even more relevant for public relations, Stiglitz focused on the underlying infor-
mation asymmetries behind adverse selection and so provided the unifying term for the work by the three Nobel laureates.
Stiglitz analyzed how “some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not robust to considerations of imper-
fect information” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976: 629). Information, he proposes, is a public good which can never be optimally
distributed by a private market (mostly because some information is too costly to get, relative to its beneﬁt). When a party
to a transaction has more relevant information than others, information is asymmetric and competitive markets become
inefﬁcient. It is therefore the privatization of information by some – not all – market participants that can ultimately lead to
adverse selection. That this is to society’s detriment becomes particularly obvious when a party feels insufﬁciently informed
about a transaction’s externalities (pollution, conditions of outsourced labor, etc.), or when a party suspects “moral hazard”
(Arrow, 1963; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983), i.e., detrimental actions taken by the other party after
a transaction has been agreed upon.
4. The informational context of public relations
With the Nobel Prize in 2001 for information asymmetry came the global acknowledgement “that understanding how
information is obtained and disseminated is critical for understanding how economies function” (Barkley Rosser, 2003).
More information – about a commodity, about its sellers, about the nature of the transaction between seller and buyer,
about externalities and about the propensity of both sides to abide by the mutually accepted nature of their relationship –
would reduce the asymmetries and preserve the abilities of markets to efﬁciently create wealth for societies. Even small,
speciﬁc changes in the organization of information were shown to have major impact on markets, economies and societies
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1985a,b; Stiglitz, 2000). This “information economics revolution” was  therefore also a call to the academy
to provide speciﬁc insight into how markets can improve the organization, creation and dissemination of information.
Consequently, information asymmetry has generated a wide range of economic explanations of how social institutions
emerge that can counteract market inefﬁciencies and failures (Loefgren, Persson, & Weibull, 2002). The public relations
academy could have joined that debate and analyzed its own social phenomena and institutions, but did not (Wildmann,
2008). Instead, that analysis was also left to economists.
Reputation, for example, was conceptualized by economists as a remedy against market failure caused by adverse selec-
tion (Kim, 2009): If buyers knew that the risk of getting ‘lemons’ from sellers was  low, average prices would not be depressed
and high-quality sellers might not be driven out of the market. Reputation is therefore a promise of quality. When informa-
tion is asymmetric, economic actors will build reputation to maximize their own  utility and secure repeated transactions.
This rational investment into their own reputation prepares the ground for stable markets with more efﬁcient outcomes.
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Building reputation becomes “an asset which can generate future rents” (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988: 443). However, this
would only happen if the cost for building reputation were not prohibitively higher than its reward, as is the case in markets
with infrequent repeat sales (Riley, 2001). Also, when the reward is not immediate, but economic actors need to maintain
reputation strategies for a long time, their propensity to do so becomes lower (Mayhew, 2001).
Possibly because its costs are easiest to specify, the economists’ debate around information asymmetry next turned to
advertising as the principal reputation-building activity (Spence, 1980). In economic modeling, advertising creates market
equilibriums by being a rational investment for ﬁrms with high-quality goods (who set up market-entry barriers), but from
which sellers of low-quality goods will refrain with equal rationality (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Nelson, 1974).
5. An economic conceptualization of public relations
However, the economic academy’s advances into reputation and communication do not yet sufﬁce for an economic
reconceptualization of public relations. Economists have not advanced into the – certainly relative to advertising – more
dialogic nature of public relations. More importantly, public relations as a social institution comprises far more than market
transactions and involves multiple stakeholders in a dialog about the very externalities identiﬁed by economic theory, like
a ﬁrm’s carbon footprint, its workers’ conditions, its diversity policy, etc.
The authors propose an economic conceptualization of public relations by understanding its role in the context of
information asymmetry, which in turn enables the identiﬁcation of its relevance to markets and society.
5.1. Public relations as signaling and screening
As described above, economic actors beneﬁt from investing in the reduction of information asymmetry, as it establishes
their reputation and thus sustains the long-term efﬁciency of the market in which they operate. In addition, if not for
economic actors’ own investments, governments or other external bodies would regulate the market to reduce information
asymmetry (e.g. compare the markets for hotels with those highly regulated markets for private education), thereby quite
possibly creating even higher costs of compliance.
Organizations and other economic actors resort to signaling (revealing discretionary information) and screening (giving
information when forced to choose from a limited number of options given by the other party), e.g. when a corporation
responds to activist investors or to a public agenda built by its critics (Spence, 1973, 2002; Stiglitz, 1975; Zoch & Molleda,
2006). We  propose that public relations can be understood as signaling and screening.
Signals are voluntary, observable and costly investments in information that will allow receivers to better discern qualities
that they can otherwise not assess (e.g. rankings to indicate the quality of universities, environmental certiﬁcations of
corporations) and allow them to discern the height of the investment needed by the organization to send the signal.
Screening is more closely related to risk than signaling. It is designed to avoid moral hazard by forcing senders to reveal
information about their riskiness (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). A recent example is the prominent blogger Vani Hari (‘Food-
babe’) who gathered 44,000 signatures and challenged the world’s biggest brewers to list the potentially harmful ingredients
in their beers for the ﬁrst time. Two brewers quickly followed suit and revealed the information.
5.2. Public relations counteracts adverse selection
Spence (1973, 1974) proved the critical economic assumption that signaling only succeeds if the costs visibly vary between
senders: the higher quality senders will ﬁnd it less costly to do signaling and respond to screening than others, and this needs
to be sufﬁciently apparent to recipients. For example, it is apparent to recipients that the costs to reputable organizations
of living up to their signals is lower than to disreputable ones: Timberland, with its business model around reforestation in
Brazil, risks much less when it comments on natural preservation than Nestle with its connection to palm-oil monocultures
in Southeast Asia. The perceived cost (lost credibility and future market transactions) of misrepresentation is higher for the
latter (Spence, 1976) and “the signal will only signify something real if there is a negative correlation between signaling
costs and [. . .]  capability” (Barkley Rosser, 2003: 8). Public relations professionals might call this “the credibility gap,” where
words (or other signals) and actions are seen to be out of kilter.
While the proposed conceptualization of public relations is therefore most obvious for ﬁrms, it ultimately comprises
every organization in a market economy, because even not-for-proﬁt organizations depend on negotiating their resources
in a competitive process for which the costs are lower the better the organization manages its relations to allied and opposing
stakeholders.
Also, signaling is the most effective in counteracting adverse selection when the quality that is being signaled is otherwise
difﬁcult to discern (Riley, 1975, 1979, 2001). This is poignantly true for externalities and moral hazards, e.g., environmental
impact, labor conditions, diversity, compliance, innovation, etc., that make up the many themes in public relations today,
as opposed to more product-related marketing communication. These externalities and an organization’s impact on them
constitute, even if not discernable to parties, moral hazard.
The authors therefore propose that public relations can be understood to reduce externalities and moral hazard, coun-
teracting adverse selection in the long run. Public relations does not contribute to the actual productivity or efﬁciency of
the sender, but rather to its ability to avoid becoming the victim of adverse selection, where the perceived value of all
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senders gravitates toward the bottom because market participants are unable to discern their differences (Kumar & Park,
2011). This can even be said to be the case in the public relations consulting industry itself, where the low reputation of the
overall industry and an inability for consultants and agencies to sufﬁciently distinguish themselves from others depresses
consulting fees.
5.3. Public relations contributes to the efﬁcient allocation of a society’s resources
Economists since Spence (1973) expect that signaling equilibriums are socially the most efﬁcient in preserving markets:
senders of high quality (for which the parameters vary, of course, and can be both strictly transactional as well as non-
monetary) opt for investing in the minimal amount of signaling required to discernably distinguish themselves from others.
The rise of the internet does not, according to Spence (2002: 454), make information asymmetries obsolete, even though
the cost of getting and exchanging information has shrunk dramatically in today’s networked societies, where information
and power are diffusing (Naim, 2013).
Using an economic lens, public relations’ contribution to society can therefore be understood as the reduction of the
relative ignorance of market participants about the nature of the transactions and relationships in which they engage,
thereby contributing to markets’ efﬁciency in allocating society’s resources. A current example is the move by some of
the world’s major corporations toward “integrated reporting” of their transactions’ externalities, which is being driven
by the accounting and public relations industries simultaneously (http://www.theiirc.org/). The ambition here is to give a
true account of how the six types of capital upon which organizations draw from society (including ﬁnancial, intellectual
and relational) are enhanced so that a correct judgment can be made on whether the organization yields value to all the
stakeholders that comprise that society.
6. Outlook
Two major caveats will need to be addressed on the way toward an economic conceptualization of public rela-
tions. Firstly, the analytical value of the economic approach is highly contextual: Not only does it depend on the
society in question having a market economy, in which both proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt organizations are allocated
resources in a competitive process, but also on having a pluralist nature and one in which the governance sphere
does not dominate, via its own claims and access to information ﬂow, public debate and market power. These
conditions often form the context for public relations in the so-called West, but rarely, for example, in any part
of Asia (Halff & Gregory, 2014). So while information asymmetry models and economics in general are universal-
ist, the conceptualization proposed in this paper can never be. Instead, the exact conditions under which it can
add analytical value to the study of public relations have yet to be identiﬁed and incorporated into future analy-
sis.
Secondly, this economic conceptualization of public relations needs to face the charge of being more normative
than analytical. After all, there are numerous examples in which public relations is detrimental to markets, and even
to society (Demetrious, 2013): manipulative or propagandist public relations increases information asymmetry, pre-
vents market efﬁciency from increasing and reduces net aggregate wealth because of the cost involved in a spiral of
competitive signaling (Spence, 1980). The economic conceptualization proposed here shares this caveat of alleged nor-
mativism with all “information asymmetry” models, which – according to both their main proponent (Stiglitz, 2002,
2006) and ideological opponents – pave the way  for government intervention and regulation in otherwise inefﬁcient
markets.
This caveat is connected, and can only be resolved together with the contextualization mentioned above: Where the right
conditions prevail, public relations can have the macro-social relevance as described in economic terms. However, in the
absence of these conditions, such conceptualizations will remain as normative as any call for market efﬁciency. We  propose
that the insights provided by economic models of information asymmetry provide opportunities for the public relations
academy to deepen its understanding of the relationship between public relations and society, once the conditions under
which this is true are identiﬁed in future research. Once those conditions are explained, the authors hope that the academy
can provide a new avenue for theoretical reﬂection and contribute to the aspiration for public relations to become socially
relevant and fulﬁll its higher obligation, as a profession, to serve the public good.
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